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This study examines whether the corporate governance rankings published by The 
Globe and Mail, a reputed national Canadian newspaper, are reflected in the values 
that investors accord to firms. A sample of 796 observations on 289 Canadian 
companies from 2002-2005 inclusively was analyzed using a price model (Cazavan-
Jeny and JeanJean, 2006). Results suggest that the corporate governance rankings 
published by this market information intermediary are related not only to firm 
value, but also to accounting results. Thus, the relationship between corporate 
governance scores and market capitalization can take two forms. First, there may be 
a direct relationship due to investor interest in good governance practices. Second, 
there may be an indirect relationship due to the impact of good governance 
practices on the firms’ accounting results. The results of this study should be useful 
for accounting practitioners and the various organizations involved in the regulation 
of corporate governance practices and the standardization of relevant data elements.   
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Author manuscript, published in "LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRￔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE,
France (2008)"1. Introduction 
 
The need for corporate governance in order to limit conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and managers, and especially the costs generated by such conflicts, is not a new phenomenon. 
Berle and Means (1932) had argued that managers must be controlled in order to avoid 
losses. Financial scandals, as seen at Enron Corp., WoldCom and Nortel in North America 
and Parmalat in Europe, have reinforced this reasoning, as serious economic stakes were 
involved. As we have seen, such scandals can cause financial markets to drop sharply, jobs to 
be lost and pension plan values to plummet. For example, the largest American pension fund 
lost over 1 billion dollars through its investments in WoldCom (Reuter, 2002). The Caisse de 
dépôt et placement du Québec, the largest pension fund in Canada, saw the value of its Nortel 
investments drop by 5 billion dollars between August 2000 and the end of December 2004 
(Girard, 2006).   
 
Financial scandals in several countries have served as grounds for new legislation to regulate 
corporate governance practices. For instance, the United States passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(Beasley and Elder, 2005), and in the United Kingdom the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
updated the Turnbull Guidance on Internal Control in October 2005. The revised Guidance 
complies with the US requirements to report on internal controls over financial reporting, as set 
out in Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and the related SEC rules. New regulations 
were established in Canada as well (Barnes, Johnson and Yarmus, 2004), in particular by the 
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), to address the responsibilities and composition of the 
Audit Committee (National instrument NI 52-110), the roles of both the chief executive officer 
and the chief financial officer to ensure the accuracy and quality of reported information, (NI 
52-108), and auditor oversight (NI 52-108). In 2005, the OSC also set up new guidelines for 
corporate governance (NI 58-201) and the disclosure of corporate governance mechanisms (NI 
58-101).   
 
Parallel to these initiatives, some capital market participants, market information 
intermediaries and academics were focusing on corporate governance practices. Their interests 
were varied. Capital market participants needed to identify situations that were potentially 
favourable to earning management as well as potentially harmful opportunist behaviours. 
Some market information intermediaries, such as Standard and Poor’s, Governance Metrics 
International,  Institutional Shareholder Services, and The Globe and Mail newspaper in 
Canada, understood this issue and developed corporate governance ranking systems for capital 
market participants. These were potentially more useful and less expensive than collecting the 
information for oneself. The objective of this paper was to examine whether one such 
corporate governance practices ranking system, published by The Globe and Mail, is taken into 
account by investors. 
 
A valorization model was used to examine this issue. A sample of 796 observations on 289 
Canadian companies from 2002-2005 inclusively was analyzed. Results suggest that 
investors indeed take into account corporate governance rankings. They also suggest that the 
corporate governance rankings are at least partly reflected in the accounting results. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds new empirical 
observations to past studies that addressed the relationships between firm value and corporate 
governance practices. Second, it triangulates the results of certain studies conducted in the 
Canadian context (Gupta, Kennedy and Weaver, 2006; Klein, Shapiro and Young, 2005) by 









































0observations. This paper also has significant practical implications. It provides new empirical 
results that would be useful for various organizations involved in the regulation of corporate 
governance practices and the standardization governance-related data. For example, the 
results support several recommendations put forward by the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants on director independence (Lyndsay, 2005) and the need for a formal system to 
assess the performance of the board and individual directors (Leblanc, 2005) and the amount 
of stock options granted (Greville and Crawford, 2003).  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant literature, 
section 3 describes the empirical model and the sample, section 4 presents the main results, 
and section 5 reports the main conclusions of the study, its limitations and potential research 
avenues.   
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) proposed a broad definition of corporate governance: corporate 
governance concerns the ways in which suppliers of funds and the corporations themselves 
ensure returns on investment. This definition is based on agency theory and the principal-
agent relationship. The delegation of management by the principal to the agent involves 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that result in agency costs.  
 
“An entrepreneur, or a manager, raises funds from investors either to put 
them to productive use or to cash out his holding in the firm. The financiers 
need the manager’s specialized human capital to generate returns on their 
funds. The manager needs the financiers’ funds, since he either does not 
have enough capital of his own to invest or else wants to cash out his 
holding. But how can financiers be sure that, once they sink their funds, 
they get anything but worthless pieces of paper back from the manager? 
The agency problem in this context refers to the difficulties financiers have 
in assuring that their funds are not expropriated or wasted on unattractive 
projects.” (Shleifer and Vishny; 1997, p. 740-741).  
 
In order to minimize these agency costs, a good corporate governance system should combine 
large investors of some kind with legal protection of both their rights and those of small 
investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Using a similar approach, Picou and Rubach (2006) 
define corporate governance as the construction of rules, practices, and incentives to 
effectively align the interests of the agents (boards and managers) with those of the principals 
(capital suppliers). Kyerebaoh-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) view the set of legal protections 
(company laws, stock exchange listing rules, and accounting standards) as a way to both 
shape and be shaped by the system of corporate governance mechanisms in place.   
 
Beyond these definitions of corporate governance, a consensus on the defining elements of a 
good governance framework has yet to be reached, and is even farther from being reached in 
the academic community (Gupta, Kennedy and Weaver, 2006). Up to now, most studies on 
corporate governance have used distinct methodologies to address particular elements of 
corporate governance. This makes previous results difficult to reconcile. Among the various 
elements studied, we can mention board composition (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein, 1994; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 









































0Jermias, 2006; Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006), shareholding (Barnhart and 
Rosenstein, 1998; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; Chen, 2001; Pederson and Thomsen, 2003; 
Bai and al., 2004; Clark and Wojcik, 2005; Krivogorski, 2006; Shen, Hsu and Chen, 2006), 
compensation issues (Cordeiro and Veliyath, 2003), and shareholder rights (Chi, 2005).  
 
As mentioned above, despite the lack of consensus on the elements that would define a 
framework for good governance practices, some information intermediaries have developed 
corporate governance ranking systems that provide useful information to capital market 
participants. For example, Standard and Poor’s developed the Standard & Poor’s Corporate 
Governance Scores. These cover various components related to ownership structure and the 
influence of external stakeholders, investor rights and relations, transparency and disclosure, 
and board structure and processes. The Governance Metrics International (GMI) scores 
address board accountability, financial disclosures and internal controls, shareholder rights, 
remuneration, the market for control, and corporate behaviour. The Institutional Shareholder 
Services, for its part, assesses companies based on information related to the board of 
directors, audits, charter and bylaw provisions, anti-takeover provisions, executive and 
director compensation, progressive practices, ownership, and director education. The 
corporate governance scores developed by The Globe and Mail, a reputed national Canadian 
newspaper, take into account information on board composition, shareholding and 
compensation issues, shareholder rights issues, and disclosures issues.   
 
These information intermediaries can play a valuable role in improving market efficiency 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001), as long as investors find the information useful. The Globe and 
Mail’s corporate governance scores were developed based on the “tough set of best practices 
culled from the corporate governance guidelines and recommendations of US and Canadian 
regulators, as well as major institutional investors and associations.” (McFarland, 2002, 
Klein, Shapiro and Young, 2005). It is also important to point out that, unlike other corporate 
governance rankings, these scores are not very expensive. Moreover, they are available to all 
investors, not just specialists who can afford to buy costly data. Thus, The Globe and Mail 
corporate governance rankings do not favour certain investors over others, and we could 
argue that this avoids setting up a privileged investor class.  
 
Using various corporate governance indexes, researchers have examined whether the 
corporate governance environment is related to the firm’s financial performance (Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell, 2006; Klein, Shapiro and Young, 
2005; Gupta, Kennedy and Weaver, 2006; Brown and Caylor, 2006) Generally, their results 
tend to show that good corporate governance practices, as measured by different variables, 
are positively associated with financial performance, although the associations are not very 
strong. Among the elements that are significantly related to firm financial performance are 
the facts that: 1) all directors attend at least 75% of board meetings, 2) board members are 
elected annually, 3) board guidelines are in each proxy statement, 4) the firm has either no 
poison pill or else a shareholder-approved one, 5) re-pricing did not occur within the last 
three years, 6) average options granted in the last three years as a percentage of basic shares 
outstanding did not exceed 3%, 7) directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines 
(Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell, 2006; Brown and Caylor, 2006), and 8) the board is controlled 
by more than 50% independent outside directors (Black, Jang and Kim, 2006). 
 
Besides being available at a very low cost, the Globe and Mail corporate governance 
rankings have the advantage of including several elements that have been previously studied. 









































0first component, for 40 marks, addresses board composition. Marks are awarded for the 
number of fully independent directors on the board and the audit, compensation and 
nominating committees, split CEO and chairman roles, presence of a “cozy” or clubby 
relationship among directors, number of CEO’s outside commitments, presence of a formal 
system to assess performances of the board and individual directors, occasional meetings by 
the directors without management present, and number of board and committee meetings. 
The second component, for 23 marks, addresses shareholding and compensation issues. 
Marks are awarded if directors and the CEO are required to own stock, if directors have a 
separate option plan, and if the firm gives loans to its directors and officers. The third 
component, for 22 marks, addresses shareholder rights issues, i.e. annual re-election of all 
directors, excessive dilution arising from employee stock options, and repricing options in the 
two last years. The last component, accounting for 15 marks, deals with disclosure issues. 
Marks are awarded for firm disclosures on their corporate governance practices, relationships 
between directors, auditors and fees, board member biographies, and director attendances at 
board and committee meetings. A detailed presentation of each element’s weighting is 
provided in the Appendix. 
 
Note that the majority of previous studies examining the relations between various corporate 
governance rankings and the financial performance of firms have used a portfolio approach, 
or else have examined the relationship between Tobin’s q—or return—and corporate 
governance practices without taking into account either accounting results or potentially 
hidden correlations between corporate governance practices scores and accounting results 
(Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Klein, Shapiro and Young, 
2005; Gupta, Kennedy and Weaver, 2006). This study adds to the knowledge by examining 
the relationships between corporate governance scores and financial performance while 




3. Research design and sample  
 
 
a)  Research design 
 
In order to investigate the relationships between the corporate governance and sub-index 
scores published by The Globe and Mail and the financial performance of the firms, a model 
analogous to Cazavan-Jeny and JeanJean (2006) was used (Equation 1). We therefore 
propose the following regression model:   
 





Pjt+τ    = share price of firm j at time t+τ;  
τ   = time between the closing date of the last financial period and the publication date 
of the financial results;  
BVEjt   = book value of equity of firm j at time t, standardized by the number of shares in 









































0NIjt   = net income of firm j at time t, standardized by the number of shares in circulation 
at time t;  
CGSjt   = composite corporate governance scores and sub-scores published by The Globe and 
Mail; 
YEARjt = {A2003jt, A2004jt, A2005jt);  
A2003jt  (A2004jt, A2005jt) = dummy variable representing each year covered by the 
observations (equal to 1 if the year covered by the observation 
is 2003 [2004, 2005] and 0 otherwise);  
εjt    = error term.   
 
This model relates share price to book value of equity (BVEjt) and current benefit (NIjt). The 
inclusion of the The Globe and Mail’s corporate governance scores in the investor price or 
index is examined for level of significance of the regression coefficients α3-6. These 
coefficients should be positive and significantly different from 0. We also included dummies to 
control for fixed year effect. 
 
 
b)  Sample 
 
The sample used in this study is composed of all the Canadian companies covered by The 
Globe and Mail corporate governance rankings for years 2002 to 2005 for which 1) financial 
statements were available on the www.sedar.com database and 2) share price data was 
available from the TSX-CFMRC database. Accounting data was collected from the annual 
reports for 2002 to 2005 and share price data was collected from the TSX-CFMRC database. 
In all, 291 firms met these criteria, for a total of 804 observations. Of these, 8 observations 
presenting extreme values were removed from the sample. The final sample comprises the 





a)  Descriptive analyses 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables on which our analyses are based. The 
mean firm has a market capitalization of $4,852,469,000 CAN, a book value of 
$2,060,813,000 CAN and a net income of $252,880,000 CAN. Results indicate that the 
sampled firms have relatively large shares in Canadian markets. Composite governance 
scores appear to be relatively well distributed. Mean composite corporate governance score 
[CGS(T)jt] is 66.76/100. Average board composition sub-score [CGS(BC)jt] is 27.14/40, 
average board and CEO compensation sub-score [CGS(C)jt] is 12.46/23, average shareholder 
rights sub-score [CGS(SR)jt] is 18.09/22 and average board governance disclosure sub-score 
[CGS(D)jt] is 9.05/15.   
 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations among test variables. The largest correlations are 
between the MVt+4, BVEjt and NIjt variables. Correlations between composite governance and 
sub-index scores are also considerable. Finally, accounting and financial variables are slightly 
correlated with composite governance and sub-index scores, with correlations ranging between 










































0Table 3 summarizes the statistics from Equation 1. Regarding overall explanatory power, the 
adjusted R
2 for Model 1 indicates that the independent variables book value of equity (BVEjt) 
and net income (NIjt) explain 62% of the stock price variation. When adding the composite 
governance score [CGS(T)jt] published by the CGS (Model 2), the coefficient is positive, as 






Variables Average  Standard 
deviation 
Median Minimum  Maximum 
MV jt+4 4,852,469 8,418,420 1,655,905  12,430  61,415,475 
BVEjt 2,060,813 3,333,172  715,100  9,765  23,443,000 
NIjt 252,880 561,324  60,172 -  717,000  3,513,000 
CGS(T) jt 66.76 14.85  67  28  97 
CGS(BC) jt 27.14 8.11  28  4  40 
CGS(C) jt 12.46 4.15  13  1  23 
CGS(SR) jt 18.09 5.28  20  1  28 
CGS(D) jt 9.05 3.45  9  1  15 
1  Countable data are presented in thousands of dollars.   
MVjt+4 = market capitalization 4 months after the closing date of the financial statements; BVEjt = book value of 
equity at the closing date of the financial statements; NIjt = net income at the closing date of the financial 
statements; CGS(T) jt = total composite CGS for company j at year t; CGS(BC)jt = CGS sub-index score on board 
composition for company j at year t; CGS (C)T = sub-index score on board and CEO compensation for company j 
at year t; CGS(SR)jt = CGS sub-index score on shareholder rights for company j at year t; CGS(D) jt = CGS sub-
index score on board governance disclosure for company j at year t.   
 
stock price variation increases by only 1%. Instead of using the composite governance index, 
Model 3 uses its four distinct components. Results show that coefficients for the board and 
CEO compensation sub-index [CGS(C)jt] and the shareholder rights sub-index [CGS(SR)jt] are 
positive, as predicted, and significantly different from zero. However, neither the board 
composition sub-index [CGS(BC)jt] nor the board governance disclosure sub-index [CGS(D)jt 
are positive, and are therefore not significantly related to share price.    
 
None of the regressions for models 1, 2 or 3 present variance inflation factors higher than 2 
(Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1985). Further, we noted that composite governance shows 
significant correlation with other independent variables (BVEjt and NI jt). We therefore re-ran 
the analysis by regressing the composite governance sub-index scores on the other 
independent variables (BVEjt and NIjt). The terms of error of these auxiliary regressions were 
used as independent variables to avoid the multicollinearity with the composite corporate 
governance index score and sub-score. Results are presented for models 4, 5, 6 and 7 in Table 
3. Model 4 indicates that the independent variables equity book value (BVEjt) and net income 
(NIjt) explain 56% of the variation in stock prices compared to 62% for Model 1. However, 
when the composite corporate governance score variable is added (Model 5), the explanation 
power increases by 7% to reach 63%. Model 6 represents the addition of accounting variables 
without the multicollinearity problem arising from each of the sub-index scores. This model 
explains 52% of the variation in stock prices. Model 7 also uses the accounting variables 
without the multicollinearity problem but adds the four sub-index scores, and the overall 
explanatory power increases to 64%. Note also that in Model 7 the CGS(C)jt, CGS(SR)jt, and 









































0Composition sub-index score) coefficient is negative. These results are consistent with those 
of Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005).    
 
Table 2 
Correlations between variables  
(N=796) 
 BVEjt NIjt CGS(T) jt CGS(BC) jt CGS(C) jt CGS(SR) jt CGS(D) jt






























CGS(C) jt         0.22 
*** 0.37 
***
CGS(SR) jt           0.25 
MVjt+4 = share price of firm j at time t+τ; BVEjt = equity book value at the closing date of financial statements; 
NIjt = net income at the closing date of the financial statements; CGS(T) jt = total composite corporate governance 
score for company j at year t; CGS(BC) jt = CGS sub-index score on board composition for company j the year t; 
CGS (C) T = sub-index score on board and CEO compensation for company j at year t; CGS(SR) jt = CGS sub-
index score on shareholder rights for company J at year t; CGS(D) jt = CGS sub-index score on board governance 
disclosure for company j at year t.   
 
The significance level for White's (1980) specification test revealed homoscedasticity. We 
therefore employed White’s (1980) generalized correction method for heteroscedasticity. 
Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistics suggest the presence of autocorrelation residues 
for all models. These were re-estimated using the Yule-Walker method. Results were similar 
in all aspects to those presented in Table 3.  
 
To evaluate the robustness of results across years, Z1 and Z2 statistics were calculated (Barth 
and McNichols, 1994; Cormier and Magnan, 1997). These statistics test whether average t 
statistics observed across years are significantly different from zero. Z1 statistics assume 
independent parameter estimates, whereas Z2 statistics correct the transversal and 
chronological correlations
1 likely to exist between estimated parameters. Table 4 presents the 
statistics for the models incorporating the composite governance index [CGS(T)jt] and the 
four sub-indexes [CGS(BC)jt, CGS(C)jt, CGS(SR)jt, CGS(D)jt]. Note that these statistics were 
performed prior to correcting for multicollinearity between independent variables (BVEjt and 
NIjt) and CGS (Part A), then performed again with a correction for multicollinearity (Part B). 
Table 4 reveals that the Z1 and Z2 statistics are still significantly positive for the composite 
governance score [CGS(T)jt], significantly negative for the board composition sub-index score  




                                                           
1   The Z1 statistic is determined as follows:  ) ) 2 /( /( / 1
1 − ∑ =
a a a
N
a k k t N , where  ta  represents the t 
statistics associated with the coefficient of interest,  ka equals the degrees of freedom for the regression 
year a, and N equals number of years. The Z2 statistic is determined as follows:   
) ) 1 ( )/ /(stddev( − N t t  where, t  equals the average of t statistics; stddev (t) equals the standard 









































0  Table 3 
Models for the relevance of data elements included in the CGS
1
Dependent variable: P jt+4 (N=796) 
  Pred. sign.  M 1  M 2  M 3  M 4  M 5  M 6  M 7 
















CGS(T)jt α3 (+)  - 0.11 
*** - -  0.38 
*** - - 
CGS(BC)jt α4 (+)  -  - -0.10 -  -  -  -0.17 
***
CGS(C)jt α5 (+)  - -  0.48 
*** - - -  1.30 
***
CGS(SR)jt α6 (+)  - -  0.25 
*** - - -  0.50 
***
CGS(D)jt α7 (+)  - -  0.14  - - -  0.74 
***
























Constant  α0 (?)   5.42 
*** -1.10 -2.74  20.60 




2    0.62 0.63 0.64 0.56 0.63 0.52 0.64 
F-Statistics   263.35 224.36 154.38 206.37 224.36 172.67 154.38 
*** p ≤ 0.001; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1 (one-tailed test when the sign is predicted).  
*** p ≤ 0.001; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1 (two-tailed test when the sign is not predicted).  
1  Financial variables are measured in thousands of dollars.  
Pjt+4 = share price of firm j at time t+τ; BVE jt = equity book value at closing date of financial statements; NI jt = 
net income at closing date of financial statements; CGS(T)jt = total composite governance score for company j at 
year t; CGS(BC)jt = CGS sub-index score on board composition for company j at year t; CGS(C) T = sub-index 
score on board and CEO Compensation for company j at year t; CGS(SR)jt = CGS sub-index score on shareholder 
rights for company j at year t; CGS(D)jt = CGS sub-index score on board governance disclosure for company j at 
year t.   
 
[CGS(C)jt]. Concerning the shareholder rights sub-index score [CGS(SR)jt], average 
coefficients are positive and Z1 and Z2 statistics are significant in the models that account for 
multicollinearity. However, at 5%, the Z2 statistics are not significant in the models that do not 
account for multicollinearity. Note that these results are more ambiguous for the board 
governance disclosure sub-index score [CGS(D)jt]. Average coefficients are positive and Z1 
statistics are significant, but not the Z2 statistics. Results on this component therefore seem to 





The objective of this paper was to analyze whether investors take into account the corporate 
governance rankings published by The Globe and Mail, a reputed Canadian newspaper, in 
their evaluation of stock price. Results suggest that not only do investors consider these 
corporate governance rankings in their stock price evaluations, but also that some 
components of the firms’ corporate governance appear to be related to their accounting 
results. Indeed, the corporate governance scores published by The Globe and Mail seem to 
capture practices that could impact the firms’ accounting results (net income and shareholder 











































T-tests on statistical averages observed across years 
Dependent variable: P jt+4  
Part A: Models not corrected for multicollinearity 
    Model with CGS(T) jt  Model with CGS(T) jt components 
Mean Mean  Explanatory 
variable 
Predict  
Sign   Coef.    (t)  Z1  Z2  Coef.  (t)  Z1  Z2 
BVEjt α1 (+)  0.85  7.78  11.00  3.17 0.83   7.66  12.93  4.62 
NIjt α2 (+)  4.17  7.04    9.96  3.82 3.95   6.62  11.19  17.93 
CGS(T)jt α3 (+)  0.11 1.52   2.15 1.91 -  -  -  - 
CGS(BC)jt α4 (+)  -  -    -    -  -0.15  -1.40  -2.37  -1.80 
CGS(C)jt α5 ( +)  -  -   -   -  0.71  2.49  4.21  5.02 
CGS(SR)jt α6 ( +)  -  -   -   -  0.26   1.45  2.45  1.47 
CGS(D)jt α7 ( +)  -  -    -    -  0.24   1.21  2.04  0.62 
Constant    3.42 0.89   1.26 1.18 3.34  0.77  1.30  1.10 
Adjusted R
2     0.62      0.63      
F Statistic    109.4      57.43      
 
Part B : Models corrected for multicollinearity 
    Model with CGS(T) jt  Model with CGS(T) jt components 
Mean Mean  Explanatory 
variable 
Predict  
Sign   Coef.    (t)  Z1  Z2  Coef.  (t)  Z1  Z2 
BVEjt α1 (+)  0.85  7.78  11.00   3.17  0.83   7.66  12.94  4.62 
NIjt α2 (+)  4.17  7.04    9.96   3.82  3.95  6.62  11.19  17.93 
CGS(T)jt α3 (+)  0.37 5.44   7.70  3.07  -  -  -  - 
CGS(BC)jt α4 (+)  -  -    -    -  -0.18  -1.66  -2.80  -1.67 
CGS(C)jt α5 ( +)  -  -   -   -  1.61  5.44  9.19  3.50 
CGS(SR)jt α6 ( +)  -  -   -   -  0.46   2.49  4.20  3.89 
CGS(D)jt α7 ( +)  -  -    -    -  0.31   1.42  2.41  0.76 




 0.62       0.63      
F Statistic    109.4       57.43      
Z = 1.282 (p < 0.10) for one-tailed test; Z = 1.645 (p < 0.05) for one-tailed test; Z = 2.326 (p < 0.01) for one-tailed 
test.  
 
take two forms. First, there may be a direct relationship, due to investor interest in good 
governance practices. Second, there may be an indirect relationship due to the impact of good 
governance practices on the firms’ accounting results. 
 
The results of this study should be useful for accounting practitioners and the various 
organizations involved in the regulation of corporate governance practices and the 
standardization of relevant data elements. The results suggest that The Globe and Mail’s 
corporate governance practices ranking system captures certain elements associated with 
better accounting results, which are taken into account by investors. This could contribute to 
identify the defining elements of a framework for good governance practices (Coffee, 2005; 
Maniam, Subramaniam, Johnson, 2006), at least in a Canadian context (Greville and 









































0elements in a disaggregated way in further studies in order to more precisely identify good 
governance practices that could wield a greater impact on accounting results.  
 
We recognize certain limitations of this study. One is that potential interrelations between 
corporate governance practices and contextual variables were not taken into account. Recent 
studies have shown that certain corporate governance practices are interconnected, and may 
be more effective in certain contexts (Bozec, 2005; Gani and Jermias, 2006; Boujenoui and 
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Appendix  The Report on Business (ROB) rating system 
Category A: Board composition   Rating (maximum of 40 points out of 100) 
1. What percentage of a company's directors 
are fully independent? 
•  8 points for boards with at least two-thirds 
independent directors. 
•  4 points if more than 50 per cent are independent. 
•  0 points if there are a majority of related directors. 
2. What percentage of the audit committee is 
fully independent? 
•  6 points if the committee is fully independent. 
•  2 points if there are one or more related directors 
who are not management. 
•  0 points if a member of management is on the 
committee. 
3. What percentage of the compensation 
committee – the committee that determines 
executive pay – is fully independent? 
•  4 points if the committee is fully independent. 
•  2 points if there is one or more related directors 
who are not management. 
•  0 points if a member of management is on the 
committee. None if there is no compensation 
committee. 
4. What percentage of the nominating 
committee – the committee responsible for 
recommending new directors – is fully 
independent? 
•  3 points if the committee is fully independent. 
•  2 points if there is one or more related directors 
who are not management. 
•  0 points if a member of management is on the 
committee. No points if there is no nominating 
committee. 
5. Is the role of chairman and CEO split? And 
if not, is there a lead director? 
•  5 points if the jobs are split. 
•  2 points if the chairman is also a related director. 
•  3 points if the job is not split, but there is an 
independent lead director. 
6. Are there cozy or clubby relationships 
among directors? Are directors stretched too 
thin?  
Start with a maximum of 5 points. 
•  Minus 3 points if the CEO (or executive chairman) 
of the company swaps boards with the CEO of 
another company. 
•  Minus 2 points whenever 3 or more directors are 
together on the board of another public company. 
•  Minus 2 points for any director who is on more than 
8 other for-profit corporate boards (score can go 
below zero). 
7. Is the company's CEO busy with outside 
commitments? 
•  Zero if the CEO sits on four or more other boards of 
publicly traded companies. 
•  2 points if the CEO sits on three or fewer other 
boards of publicly traded companies.  
8. Does the company have a formal system to 
evaluate the performance of the board and 
individual directors? 
•  2 points if yes, 0 if no. 
9. Do directors sometimes meet without 
management present? 









































010. How often does the board meet? And how 
often do the key committees meet? 
•  3 points if the information is disclosed, and the 
board meets at least four times a year and the audit 
committee meets at least four times. 
•  1 point if they meet less often, or if there is only 
partial information about the number of meetings. 
•  0 points if the company does not disclose how often 
its directors met last year. 
 
Category B: Shareholding and 
compensation issues 
Rating (maximum of 23 points out of 100) 
•  4 points if share ownership is mandatory and equals 
at least three times the annual retainer paid to 
directors. 
•  2 points if mandatory, but ownership requirement is 
lower. 
1.a) Are directors required to own stock? 
(Stock options don't count.) 
•  Zero if ownership is not mandatory. 
1.b) Do the directors own stock?   4 points maximum. 
•  Minus a point for each director who has less than 
1,000 shares after sitting on the board for at least a 
year (can go below zero). 
2.a) Is the CEO required to own stock? (Stock 
options don't count.) 
•  3 points if it is required, or if the CEO is the 
majority or controlling shareholder of the firm. 
2.b) Does the CEO own shares?  •  3 points if the CEO owns more than 50,000 shares 
after two years on the job. 
•  2 points if more than 20,000 shares.  
•  Zero if less than 20,000 shares. 
For CEOs on the job for under two years, the ROB 
lowered the ownership levels to qualify for full points. 
3. Are directors in their own separate option 
plan? 
•  3 points if yes, or if directors don't get stock 
options. 
•  6 points if there are no loans, or if the company is a 
bank and makes consumer loans with interest 
payable. 
4. Does the company give loans to directors 
or officers? 
•  Zero points if loans are interest free. Part marks 
were given for companies that make loans with 
interest for share. purchases, or for other purposes. 
Marks decline depending on the size of the loans. 
 
Category C : Shareholder rights issues  Rating (maximum of 22 points out of 100) 
1. Do all directors stand for re-election 
annually? Or is the board elected on 
staggered terms to make it difficult to oust 
an unpopular group? 
•  2 points for annual election of all directors. 
•  Zero points for staggered boards. 
2. Are employee stock options excessively 
dilutive for shareholders? 
•  8 points if dilution is less than 5% of outstanding 
shares. 
•  6 points if dilution is between 5% and 10% because 
this is high but within acceptable levels. 










































3. Did the company reprice its options in 2001 
or 2002? (Or extend their exercise date, or 
allow them to be exchanged for lower-
priced options.) 
•  4 points for no.  
•  Zero for yes. 
4. Are there non-voting or subordinate voting 
shares? 
•  8 points if no. 
•  No marks if the voting control is five times greater 
than the ownership stake. 
 
Category D: Disclosure issues  Rating (maximum of 15 points out of 100) 
1. Does the company have a full statement of 
corporate governance practices?  
•  3 marks if the company fully addresses all topics 
required by the Ontario Securities Commission, 
including a discussion of whether it complies with 
each guideline, and, if not, why not. 
•  1 mark if the company gives partial answers or 
chooses to discuss some of the requirements.  
•  Zero if there is no statement of governance 
practices 
2. Does the company fully name and explain 
which of its directors are "related," and 
why? 
•  4 points for full disclosure of relationships. 
•  2 points if information is missing. One point if the 
company lists the number of related and unrelated 
without identifying the individuals. 
•  1 point if the company lists as "unrelated" anyone 
the ROB considers related. 
3. Does the company disclose how much it 
paid its auditor for consulting and other 
work? 
•  4 marks for disclosure (minus 1 mark if the work 
exceeds the value of the audit and minus 2 marks if 
the work is more than double the value of the audit 
work). 
4. Does the company disclose full biographies 
of its board members? Does it list the other 
boards its directors sit on?  
•  1 point for each.  
 
5. Does the company disclose attendance 
records of its directors at board and 
committee meetings? 
•  2 points for disclosure, but minus 1 for poor 
attendance. 
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